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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
VERNE J. OBERHANSLY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

' ..

,.....,.,

~...._·

.

TRAVELERS INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
On September 28, 1953, defendant Travelers Insurance Company issued to LaMar Pearce Auto Mart its
standard comprehensive liability policy with attached
amendments (see Exhibit "A"), which policy was in
force at the time of the accident hereinafter referred to.
On November 27, 1953, plaintiff sustained an injury
whil~ riding in a car registered in the name of Pearce's
wife, but being driven by LaMar Pearce, President of
Pearce Auto Mart, upon which he ultimately recovered
a judgment for the sum of $9,112.23. Pearce and his
company were insolvent and unable to pay the judgment, whereupon plaintiff filed this action against
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Travelers Insurance Company seeking to recover the
amount of his judgment. Defendant defended the action
upon three counts :
(1) That at the time of the accident plaintiff was
either an employee of Pearce Auto Mart or it was an
obligation for which the insured may be held liable under
the Workmen's Compensation Law of this State and
therefore expressly excluded under the terms of the
policy.
That the insured failed to cooperate with the
insurer in the defense of the action and notwithstanding
the company's request willfully and in violation of the
terms of the policy Pearce failed and refused to attend
the trial; failed to give evidence thereat as required by
the terms and provisions of the policy.
( 2)

That Pearce and his business associate, Keith
Oberhansly, brother of the plaintiff, conspired to rendel"
aid to plaintiff thereby assisting him in procuring the
judgment by
(3)

. . (a) permitting Keith Oberhansly, brother of
plaintiff, to testify contrary to a written
statement made bv him on or about January
1, 1954,and
(b) by defendant Pearce's refusal to attend the
trial, to assist in the defense of the action and
failing to offer hin1self as a witness in his own
behalf and in behalf of the company.

A jury was impaneled but upon conclusion of all of
the evidence plaintiff moved for an instructed verdict
and defendant moved for judgment of dis1nissal. Both
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parties having moved to take the case from the jury
for the reason that there was no issuable facts to be
presented to a jury, the Court thereupon dismissed the
jury and thereafter made and entered findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment in favor of plaintiff.
Neither party is complaining as to the action of the Court
in dismissing the jury.
STATEMENT OF FACT'S
As we view the record, there is no dispute as to the
facts in this case. We shall briefly summarize these
facts:
Status of Plaintiff
First Defense
While Keith Oberhansly was not formally admitted
to tl'. . a corporation as an officer or stockholder, yet it was
the understanding of the parties that he would be made
an officer of the company and share equally in the
profits. He was working full time at the company's place
of business under an agreement that he was to receive
one-half of the profits derived from the operation of said
business. His relationship to the company was characterized by Pearce as a partnership arrangement. Pearce
Auto Mart was a dealer in used cars. As a part of its
regular business it accepted for sale used cars from
various ·owners delivered to it on consignment for sale
upon a commission basis. Under this arrangement it had
accepted a number of used cars from Spencer Auto
Company of Evanston, Wyoming.
3
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For convenience we shall hereafter designate Pearce
as LaMar; his business associate as Keith, and the plaintiff as Verne.
LaMar and Keith were having financial difficulties
and they decided to return two remaining unsold cars
to Spencer Auto Company at Evanston, Wyoming. They
called Verne and asked him if he would drive one of these
cars. He indicated a willingness to do so and immediately thereafter came to the company's place of business,
whereupon it was agreed between LaMar, Keith and
Verne that Verne and Keith would drive the two consigned cars and LaMar would follow them in the insured
car and bring them back to Ogden. The return of these
cars constituted a part· of the regular and customary
business. In fact erne had on at least one or two previous occasions performed a similar service. Verne
stated that he would drive the car provided he was· furnished sufficient money to defray the expenses incident
to said trip. He was given $10.00 and sufficient gas
and oil was purchased by him at cost of between $4.00
and $5·~oo. Keith and Verne left Ogden about 3 :00 o'clock
P~M. and LaMar left some time later and overtook them
at Echo Junction and then followed them to Evanston.
The cars were delivered. The three then had dinner and
then started on the return trip to Ogden. LaMar was
the driver. The accident occurred at a point known as
Devil's Gate in Weber Canyon during the course of the
return journey. Verne sustained injuries which resulted
in the judgment.

'r

4
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Failure to ()ooperate
Second Defense

No report of the accident was submitted to defendant
until after LaMar was served with a ten da)' summons
on or about December 16, 1953. On January 7, 1954, as a
part of an investigation concerning the accident, written
statements were prepared and signed by both LaMar
and Keith. These statements were written by one Wilde,
an investigator employed by defendant, during the course
of conversations related by them giving in detail the
facts concerning the accident. The statements were in
many respects. quite similar. They first related the facts
concerning the driving of the cars. Then in relating how
the accident happened they stated that LaMar while
rounding the S curve may have been driving faster than
he should but that his driving at no time was erratic and
that at all times he kept his car on his right hand side of
the highway; that as he rounded the curve they observed
for the first time a large truck about 70 :feet distant
travelling eastward and rounding the curve; that it was
approaching on its left hand side of the highway immediately in front of LaMar; that in order to avoid a
collision LaMar pulled quickly to his right off the traveled portion of the highway and struck the rocky precipitous wall which arose almost perpendicularly at the
outer edge of the highway; that thereupon LaMar lost
control of his car and struck the protective guard rail
on the opposite side of the highway and that the striking
of the guard rail was what caused Verne to sustain the
injuries of which he complained.
5
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Based upon these two written statements given freely by the two eye witnesses concerning the accident and
who were incidentally the only known eye witnesses (as
Verne was lying down in the back seat and did not see
the accident), the insurance company believed that LaMar's negligence, if any, in driving faster than he should
was not the proximate cause of the accident but that the
intervening act of the driver of the eastbound truck in
crowding them off the highway was the proximate cause
of the accident and that consequently both LaMar and
his company had a meritorious case. Defendant likewise
concluded that there was a serious question as to whether
or not the exclusion provision of its policy would apply
in view of the facts outlined above as to the relationship
of the parties. Defendant thereupon requested and received from LaMar a "Reservation of its Rights Agreement" and upon procuring the same it accepted the defense of the action. Shortly thereafter the business failed
an4 LaMar left the State of Utah, presumably heavily
indebted, knowing that the suit against him and the company was then pending in the court. His wife remained
in Ogden for some time.
LaMar had e1nployed an attorney, E. Morgan Wixom
of Ogden, Utah, to represent him and the company concerning various legal problems in connection with the
operation and winding up of the business and he also
consulted with Wixom with respect to the signing of the
Reservation of Rights Agreen1ent. After leaving the
State LaMar never communic.ated with the defendant or
6
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let it know where he was residing and although his address was known to his wife, his father and Wixom,
neither of these parties would reveal to defendant his
whereabouts. The case was duly and regularly set for
trial for November 18, 1954. Defendant had made several
efforts to obtain LaMar's address without success. It had
addressed letters both to the wife. and to Wixom. The
letter to the wife was returned unclaimed, she having
in the meantime left Ogden. The letter to Wixom was
never answered. Finally Attorney LeRoy B. Young, who
was representing the defendant, learned that Wixom
knew his address. Upon contacting Wixom he furnished
Young the address upon condition that he Young would
not reveal to anyone outside of his office this information, whereupon on September 28, 1954, Young wrote
Pearce the following letter which was registered, to-wit:
"Mr. LaMar Pearce
302 H. Street
Antioch, California
"Re: Verne J. Oberhansly
vs. LaMar Pearce
"Dear Mr. Pearce:
"Permit me to advise you that this case has
been set for trial for November 18, 1954, at 10 :00
o'clock A.M. I am writing you at this time so that
you will have ample notice of the date and place
of this trial. It is imperative that you be here by
not later than November 17th and that you immediately report to our office upon your arrival
so that we will have the benefit of a conference
together in advance of trial.
7
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"You realize, of course, that under the terms
of your policy you are required to give full cooperation to the insurance company in the defense
of· this action.
"May I hear from you immediately so that I
will know that you have received this letter and
advise me if we can count on you being here on
November 17, 1954.
"Yours very truly,
"YOUNG, THATCHER &
GLASMANN
"LeRoy B. Young."
";LaMar received this letter on October 1, 1954. He
never answered. the same nor did he make any effort to
~ontact the defendant. However, so1ne time later LaMar's father called Young by phone and advised him
that he had just talked to Lal\1:ar by phone and that
LaMar had requested him to advise Young that he, LaMar, would not or could not come to the trial because of
his job. Young then requested and obtained from the
father a promise that he would call La:hriar and explain
to him the need of his being present and a request that
he reconsider the matter and attend the trial. ·The father
promised Young he would do so, and he did thereafter
call LaMar and conveyed this 1nessage to him. However,
LaMar did not write either Young or the insurance company and made no further explanation as to his intentions. As the thne for the trial "~as approaching and
Young not having received any direct reply to his letter
or to th~ request relayed through the father, then con8
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tacted Wixom and asked him to intercede and try to persuade LaMar to come. In compliance with this request
Wixom on October 27, 1954, wrote LaMar the following
letter:
"Dear LaMar:
''Mr. LeRoy B. Young has informed me that
you advised him that you would not be present for
the trial of the action brought against you and
LaMar Pearce Auto Mart by Mr. Oberhansly for
injuries he sustained in an automobile collision.
I think LaMar that you should use every effort
to make it to the trial. You are your own best
witness and if you do not cooperate with your
insurance company and appear at the trial, your
chances to be reimbursed by the insurance are
very slim.
"If it is money that bothers you and you cannot afford to get here, if you will wrjte to Mr.
Young and tell him, maybe the insurance company
will pay your express although they are not
obligated to do so.
"I hope that you are all getting along alright
by now. Give my regards to your wife and best
regards to you.
''Yours very truly,
"E. Morgan Wixom."
LaMar admitted in his deposition, which was taken
in California just before the trial of this action, that he
received this letter. He further admitted that his reason
for not coming was not due to the fact that he had not
been tendered costs or expenses. LaMar did not reply
to this letter written by his own attorney strongly ad9
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vising him to appear at the trial, nor did he communicate
with either defendant or Young. At no time did LaMar
request or indicate that if a continuance were obtained
he might arrange to be present. In fact in his deposition
in reply to a direct question propounded by plaintiff's
attorney, Mr. Alsup, he said:

"Q. Now why was it impossible for you to come
to Ogden at the time you received this letter
and were told when the trial was to be held~
A.

Mainly from the standpoint of competition in
any job or in any field of endeavor that you
get into today you just-to go into your employer and tell him you are requested to appear at a trial 800 miles away and being
more or less an unknown as far as he was
concerned, it is not going to be anything but
a reflection against your character and your
ability. Keep on the job you are striving to
do.

Q.

Now state whether or not your leaving at that
time would have jeopardized your chance at
getting your promotion.

A.

It would have jeopardized my chance definitely.

Q.

Now would it have not been possible and
easier for you to eon1e to Ogden to this trial
at a later date~

A.

It could possibly have been arranged, yes.
Still you must realize gentlemen, in this auto~
mobile business today, I mean not only in the
automobile business, but in any business with
competition sueh as it is, to leave a location
for-it would have taken a week to have10
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would have impaired my chances or could
have disrupted my whole chance of remaining
there as a steady employee."
Later on LaMar made the following statement:
"Might I state this gentlemen, that frankly
I thought my written statement, my signed written statement orally read would have takep. care
of my position being at the trial. I felt that that
was sufficient. The facts were stated. That was
what it amounts to."
LaMar admitted that he never at any ti1ne wrote
either Young or the insurance company requesting them
to obtain a continuance of the trial nor advising them
when he could appear if a continuation was obtained, nor
did he inquire as to whether or not his written state1nent
could be used in lieu of his appearance. It is fair to
assume, we think, from his attitude and from his answers
contained in the deposition that it was not a question of
coming at some later date but that he had no intention
of ever coming back to Utah to testify at the trial. He
does not contend that he ever even so much as asked his
employer if he might obtain a leave for a short time in
order to enable him to appear as a witness in the trial.
Instead of taking a week he could, of course, have come
by air, attended a trial which only consumed two day's
time and could have returned to his employment with an
absence of not more than two days. Instead of doing this
he took it upon himself to conclude that he would neither
write the company nor its attorney nor would he appear
at the trial.
11
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It is important to bear this in mind by reason of
some of the contentions being made by the plaintiff in
this case.
On the date set for the trial LaMar did not appear.
Defendant, however, did not do what many insurance
companies have done when confronted with this situation. Defendant did not walk out and allow a default
judgment to be entered for possibly $50,000, but defendant conducted the best defense it could without any aid,
assistance or testimony by La~far and the jury returned
a verdict for $9,112.23.
At the ti1ne of the trial Verne called his brother
Keith as a witness. His testimony was in certain respects
totally at variance with his written statement. In the
written statement both he and LaMar had stated that
Verne was given $10.00 and his dinner for driving the
car. Nothing was said about his using this n1oney for
gas and oil and buying dinners for the thre€ of the1n
although the vvhole subject \Vas discussed in detail with
Wilde. He also stated that La~Iar in rounding the curve
swung wide over and into his left hand side of the high'vay and that the truck was approaching on its O\Yn side
of the highway. He ad1nitted that this testin1ony \Vas in
direct conflict with his \Yritten staten1ents but had the
effrontery to say he made untrue state1nents to the adjuster in an atte1npt to help La:\Iar. It is quite apparent
therefore that \vithout the help and assistance of La~Iar
and without the benefit of his testin1ony defendant could
do nothing except to try to keep the da1nages as lo"\\ as
possible.
7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1. The Court erred in entering its Finding
No. 5 for the reason that it is not supported by the evidence but is contrary to all of the evidence in the case.
POINT 2. The Court erred in entering the following portion of Finding No. 6:
"But he did not fail to cooperate with the
defendant insurance company, nor did he fail to
comply with the terms of said insurance contract,"
for the reason that said finding is not supported by the
evidence in the case but is contrary to the uncontradicted
evidence.
POINT 3. The Court erred in making and entering
its Conclusion of Law No. 1 for the reason it is not supported by the evidence. It is contrary to all of the evidence in the case and is against law.
POINT 4. The Court erred in entering its judgment in favor of plaintiff for the su1n of $9,780.48 and in
entering a judgment for any amount for the reason said
judgment is not supported by the evidence but is contrary thereto and is against law.
POINT 5. The Court erred in not making and entering Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff for the
reason that such a judgment would be supported by all
of the evidence and would be in accordance with law.

13
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS
FINDING NO. 5 F·OR THE REASON THAT IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE BU'T IS ·CON.TRARY TO ALL
OF THE EVIDEN·CE IN THE CASE.

The Court found in Finding Number 5 "at the time
plaintiff herein suffered said accidental injuries he was
riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by said
LaMar Pearce and he was not an employee of said insured within the meaning of that word as used in the
policy and as quoted in paragraph 4 hereof, nor were
the insureds liable for any injuries under any \Vorkman's Compensation Law."
The provision of the policy relied upon by appellant
is quoted in Finding Number 4, whereby there is excluded
from the provisions of the policy (a) any employee of
the insured while engaged in the employment of the insured, and (b) one whose injury benefits are payable or
required to be provided under any W orlanan's Compensation Law.
It is the position of the appellant that under the
uncontradicted evidence plaintiff "\vas an employee of
Pearce Auto Mart both (a) under the comn1on la"\\~, and
(b) under the v'l orkman's Compensation Act of the
State of Utah.
We think respondent "~ill admit that if plaintiff was
an employee of the Auto 1\Iart "\Yhile driYing the automobile fro1n Ogd<.>n to Evanston, that this relationship
continued as a part of the san1e employment on the re-

14
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turn trip so that we shall discuss this phase of the question from the relationship which was created in the first
instance.
Under the admitted facts as outlined let us assume
that plaintiff while driving this car from Ogden to
Evanston had injured a third party through his negligent operation of the automobile. Can anyone doubt
that that injured party could have recovered judgment
against the Auto Mart~ If so, it would be on the theory
of respondeat superior. Let us further assume that the
plaintiff had filed an application with the Industrial
Commission of the State of Utah for an award for the
injuries sustained by him. Can there be any doubt that
he would have obtained an award from the Industrial
Commission based upon the theory that he had sustained
an injury arising out of or in the course of his employment~

We think not and yet recovery under either of the
assumed stated facts would have to be upon the basis of
a relationship of employer-employee or master and
servant.
It is to be noted that the exclusion provision applies
to any employee of the insured while engaged in the
employment of the insured and also to anyone whose
injury benefits are payable or required to be provided
under any Workman's Compensation Law, so that the
exclusion applies if under the laws of this State plaintiff
was an employee of the insured or if he was includable
15
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as an employee under the Workman's Compensation Act
irrespective of whether his employer carried workman's
compensation or not.
What facts are to be considered in defining the relationship of employer and employee under the co1nmon
law as declared by this Court~ We have a number of
cases discussing this question. We shall cite a few of
them,
Wahlen v. lT.P.R.R., 50 Utah 450, 168 Pac. 99.
In this case the defendant contended that when deceased quit work in the mine the relationship of master
and servant ceased to exist between him and the coinpany and that when he boarded the man trip and at the
time he '\\'as killed the relation between him and the
company was that of a. carrier and passenger rather than
master and_ servant and therefore the assumption of risk
rule had no application. This court in answering this
proposition stated:
"We do not so agree. The relation of master
and servant continued to exist until the employees
boarding the Inan trap 'vere taken to the surface
of the Inine, deposited fro1n the cars and were
no longer 'ltJ~der the control of the conzpa.ny or
amenable to its rules and re.r;ulations.'~
Citing three other l_Ttah cases:

J achetta

Y.

San Pedro, 36 "[Ttah -±70, 105 Pac.

100:

Gro\v v. O.S.L., 44 Utah 160, 138 Pae. 398:
Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 93 {Ttah 577, 74
Pac. ~nd 12~5.

16
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The Gleason case is noteworthy because while· this
court held in that case that under the factual situation
relation of master and servant did not in fact exist, yet
the court "\vith the greatest of care discusses the necessary elen1ents in creating this relationship and lists the
following five elements :

1.

Right to exercise control over the details of the
work.

2.

Payment of compensation.

3.

Power of appointment.

4.

Power of dismissal.

5.

For whose benefit the given work was done.

The Court then says that the first element, that is,
the right to exercise control over the details of the work
in the last analysis must al"\vays determine what was
the essential nature of the relationship between the per. son who performed the given work and the person for
\vhose benefit it was performed. The other elements
are merely r.orro borative of the first if the first is
shown to be present; and if the first element cannot be
shown directly, the other elements are indicative of conditions which imply that control over the worker was in
fact exercised by the person declared to be the master.
We think the foregoing statement is universally
accepted by the courts, that is, in determining whether
or not the relation of master and servant exists, this
element of the right to exercise control is, in the final
analysis, the concluding test and the other four elements

17
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may be looked to merely as an aid in assisting the court
to determine the ultimate question as to whether or not
the right to control was present.
Phelps v. Boone, 67 Fed. 2nd 574,
wherein the court says:
"The usual test in such circumstances, that is
to say, the detennination of liability for negligent
~ct on the part of a servant is t.J11e right or power
on the part of the person charged to command and
control the servant in the performance of the
causal act at the moment of performance."
Badertscher v. Independent Ice Company,
55 Utah 100, 184 Pac. 181.
This is another very interesting Utah case in which the
question for determination was 'vhether certain drivers
were employees of the ice company or the coal company
and this court held that at the time in question he "'as
an agent of the coal company although he was an actual
employee of the ice company and was paid his wages by
said company.

''r

Murray v.
asatch Grading Company, 73
Utah 430, 27 4 Pac. 940.
In this case the question arose as to 'vhether the plaintiff
was an en1ployee of the defendant or of the D. & R. G.
Railroad Company. The defendant carried '\vorkman's
compensation on its O'\vn e1nployees and did not list plaintiff as one of its e1nployees. He was paid his salary by
the railroad co1npany. This court posed the question as
to whether plaintiff was an en1ployee of the defendant
grading co1npany or of the railroad con1pany. The
18
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co_urt again lists the five elements to- be considered and
then states :
"However, the ultimate question is, was the
person in question engaged in the discharge of
the duties of a servant of another- and was that
service accepted by that other. Was such service·
rendered and accepted~ If so, the law implies
the contract of master and servant between the
latter and former of employer and employee and
the existence of that relationship between them."
And this court held as a matter of law that the relation
of master and servant existed between plaintiff and the
grading company.
It is to be noted that in all of these cases as well as
cases eminating from many other jurisdictions that the
ultimate question is not whether the alleged employer
did in fact exercise control but the question is did he
retain the right of control~
We submit that under the facts of this case where
the plaintiff was asked to drive this car that the person
soliciting him to do so clearly retained the right to control him in the manner and performance of his duties
even though he did not in fact exercise that right and
had no occasion to do so, and the fact that Pearce followed plaintiff from Echo to Evanston is significant as evidence that he did in fact retain that control.
We say therefore that under the common law as it
has been announced by repeated decisions of this court
that it must be determined as a matter of law that when
plaintiff was requested to drive this car to Evanston

19
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that he was then engaged in the discharge of the duties
of a servant of the Auto Mart; that his service was accepted by said Auto Mart ; that he was performing a
duty in the regular and customary discharge of the company's business and that from this relationship there can
be no question but what the right of control did in fact
exist. Even though the employment was for a short duration of time and related only to the delivery of this car,
that fact in and of itself is not determinative of the issue.
The question presented is whether or not at the time
of the accident did such relationship exist.
Workmen's Compensation Law

As heretofore noted, the insurance poliey does not
apply if the plaintiff was an employee under the provisions of the W orlo:nen's Compensation Law of the State
of Utah or if the insured would be held liable under the
provisions of said la"\v. This requires an analysis of the
Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Utah.
Preliminary may we suggest to this court that under
its repeated pronouncements the purpose of enacting the
Workmen's Con1pensation La"\v 'vas to protect persons
against the hazards incident to en1ployment and if a
person is injured "rhile perforn1ing the duties assigned
to him, it is considered right and proper that industry
should absorb the loss just the srune as it does with respect to depletion and depreciation in n1achinery and
equip1nent a1"td that the length of tinze of employment
is i1nmaterial. The ultilnate question always is "\vhether
or not the alleged employee \vas injured "\vhile in the diseharge of the duties he \vas directed to perform. If he
20
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was so injured, then he or his dependents are entitled
to the benefits provided by the Act. In order to deter~
mine whether or not an alleged accident is compensable,
the first proposition to determine is whether or not the
alleged employer comes within the perview of the Act.
If he does not, then the Commission has no jurisdiction
over the matter. Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. 1953, defines
employers as follows :
"Every person, firm and private corporation
having in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the same business or
in and about the same esetablishment under any
contract of hire, express or ilnplied, oral or written."

It is admitted in this case that the Auto Mart had
one or more workmen regularly employed. Therefore,
the alleged employer came within the provisions of the
Act. Then Legislature defines "regularly" as follows:
"The term regularly as herein used shall include all employments in the usual course of the
trade, business, profession or occupation of the
employer, whether continuous throughout the
year or for only a portion of the year. One can be
regularly employed even though but for a short
period of time if he is engaged in the performance
of the duties incident to the business of the employer."
Section 35-1-43, U.C.A. 1953, defines "casual ernployment" as follows :
"Subdivision 2. Every person, except agricultural laborers and domestic servants, in the
service of any employer as defined in subdivision
2 of Section 35-1-42 who employes one or more
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workmen or operatives regularly in the same business or in or about the same establishment under
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written, including aliens and minors whether
legally or illegally working for hire, but not including any person whose employment is but
casual and not in the usual course of trade, business or occupation of his employment."
It will be noted therefore that an employee includes
every .~ituation where the employer employs one or more
workmen or operatives in the same business or in or
about the same establishment under any contract of hire,
express or implied, oral or written, whether legal or illegal,· and then the statute by its express terins excludes
only any person whose employr.aent is but casual and
not in th~e usual course of trade, business or occupation
of his employer.
The underscored language above is very significant.
It is to be noted that the statute above quoted does not
use the term employee or servant but relates to workmen
or operatives and is all inclusive provided the employer
regularly employs one or 1nore in his trade or business.
It is also to be noted that under the terms of this statute
the only persons \vho are excluded are persons whose elnployment is but casual and not in the usual course of
trade, business or occupation of the e1nployer. If, therefore, a workn1an's work is but casual, he is excluded as
an employee only if the \vork "~hich he is called upon to
perforn1 is not in the usual course of trade, business or
occupation of his employer.

22
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The evidence in this case without any dispute shows
that the work which this plaintiff was requested to perform was work done in the usual course of the trade,
business or occupation of the Auto Mart. If the casual
work done was in the usual course of the trade or business, then even though casual and even though for a short
duration of time he comes 'vithin the provisions of the
Act.
Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 47,
7 Pac. 2nd 284.
In this case the court construed the provision above referred to and in doing so refers to the conjunction "and,"
and says that it cannot substitute the conjunction "or,"
so that under the express wording of this statute the only
persons excludable are those casually employed in work
which is not in the usual course of the trade. Note the
following:
"By Section 3111, now 35-1-43, the employees
who are excluded are those whose employment is
but casual and is not in the usual course of trade,
business or occupation of his employer. That is,
to exclude an employee the employment must not
'only be casual but must also not be in the usual
course of the trade or business of the employer.
"This, it seems, but emphasizes the fact that
a casual or occasional employment in the usual
course of the trade or business of the employer
does not exclude the employee.
· "Had the Legislature in Section 3111 used or
instead of and, the meaning might well be different, but we are not justified in substituting
the one for the other."

23
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There are several other Utah cases which we desire
to cite which deal with this question of when and under
what circumstances the relationship of employer-employee exists under the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act. See
Weber County and Ogden City v. Industrial
Commission, 93 Utah 85, 71 Pac. 2nd
177;
Auerbach v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah
347, 195 Pac. 2nd 245.
In this case the court again refers to the test as being
primarily whether or not the right of control is retained
by the employer.
Summerville v. Industrial Commjssion, 113
Utah 504, 196 Pac. 2nd 718.
In this case the court in discussing this problem of casual
employment states that the test is whether the services
rendered are necessary to or in furtherance of employer's
usual trade, business or occupation.
Certainly under the undisputed evidence in this case
the service which the plaintiff was rendering for this
company was necessary to its business and was in the
furtherance of its trade, business or occupation.
We contend therefore that finding of fact number 5
is contrary to the undisputed evidence and that as a
matter of law the plaintiff was included in the exclusion
provision of the policy and that the court should have
found such to be the fact.
24
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POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE
FOLLOWING PORTION OF FINDING NO. 6:
"BUT HE DID NOT FAIL T'O COOPERATE WITH
THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY, NOR
DID HE FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF
SAID IN1SURANCE CONTRACT."

Before discussing this matter we desire to emphasize
that counsel will no doubt argue that the defendant insurance company failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining the cooperation of Pearce and he will no doubt
cite some cases discussing this question. While we contend that the evidence in this case shows conclusively
that defendant by its agents and attorneys did exercise
due diligence and acted in the utmost good faith in an
attempt to obtain the cooperation of Pearce and to procure his presence at the trial, yet we call attention to
this important fact : The trial court made no finding as
to whether or not defendant acted with due diligence and
such question is not within any issue within this case.
The court found only that Pearce "did not fail to cooperate with defendant nor did he fail to comply with
the terms of said contract." The judgment in this case
is bottomed solely upon this finding and must stand or
fall on this one proposition, to-wit: Did Pearce cooperate
in the defense of this action~ All other questions are
outside the issues and the findings. The question whether
the insured used due diligence is in the nature of an
estoppel which must be pleaded and proved and upon
which findings would have to be made if plaintiff relies
upon such estoppel.
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Proceeding now with a discussion of the question
it seems to us that the finding of the court that Pearce
did not fail to cooperate and that he did not fail to comply with the terms of the contract is not supported bv
any evidence, but that on the contrary the evidence is
conclusive that he did fail to cooperate and that he did
fail to comply with the terms of the contract. The condition of the liability insurance policy in question is set
forth in Sections 6 and 13 and is copied into Finding
Number 4. Unlike the provisions of some of the policies
which are set forth in the cases hereinafter to be cited,
paragraph 6 requires the insured to attend hearings and
trials as well as to cooperate with the company in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining
the attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of the
suit, and Section 13 provides that no action shall lie
against the company unless as a condition precedent
thereto the insured shall have fully complied with all
the terms of the policy.
We first desire to call to the court's attention the
fact that this action is what is deno1ninated by the courts
as a derivative action for the benefit of the insured
rather than a case where the policy itself creates a primary liability. A primary liability arises in cases where
a statute or city ordinance requires as a condition precedent to obtaining a license to operate that the applicant
must furnish a public liability bond in the form required
by the statute or ordina.n(le for the benefit of the public.
This is called a prin1ary liability as distinguished fron1
th~ casP "~her~in assured volnntaril~? obtains insurance
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for his own protection but is not required to do so. We
have no compulsory insurance law in this state. In the
case of
Goldstein v. Burnstein, 52 N.E. 2nd 559,
the court in discussing this question says:
"Their rights (third parties) in the indemnity, however, were derivative and if, by breach
of the provisions of the policy of the insure.d, the
company was discharged from its obligation to
indemnify her, it was likewise relieved of any
obligation to pay the plaintiffs. It has been said
that the rights of the third persons injured to.
have recourse to the indemnity promised by the
company do not rise any higher than those of the
insured." Citing cases.
See also
Salonen v. Paanenen, 71 N.E. 2d 227;
Royal Indemnity Company v. Olmstead, 193
Fed. 2d 451, 31 A.L.R. 2nd 635, and annotations.
In cases of derivative actions the courts agree that
such a condition is a material one and that its breach
constitutes a good defense against the insured and also
as against an injured third party who claims thereunder. See
137 A.L.R. 1008,
wherein the general rule of law is stated to be as follows:
"The authorities are in practical unimity on
this subject. A clause in an insurance policy requiring the insured's cooperation, aid and assistance in a defense of an action against him is a material condition of a policy, the violation of which
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by the insured forfeits his rights to claim indemnity_ under the policy. It is a condition precedent,
failure of which to perform in the absence of
waiver of estoppel constitutes a defense to liability on the policy."
Stacey v. F

and C of New York, 151 N.E.

718;
Royal Indemnity Company v. Morris, 37 Fed.
2d 90;
29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Page 1090.
Applying the Iule as announced by all of the foregoing authorities it is proper to then first address ourselves to the rights of the insured Pearce under this contract of insurance in the light of the undisputed evidence.
Let us assume that Pearce or his company was not insolvent and that he or the company had paid the judgment
and then sought by this action to recoup their loss under
his insurance policy. It seems to us that under such a
state of facts no court would permit a recovery under
the facts revealed by this record and if Pearce or his
company could not recover, then this plaintiff's rights
can rise no higher, and therefore he ought not to recover.
As heretofore pointed out, this policy required
Pearce in addition to cooperating to also upon the company's request attend hearings and trials. It is admitted
that Pearce did not attend the trial and that he rendered
rio assistance whatsoever to the insurance company in its
defense of this action.
We believe that this is a case of first impression in
this court. However, it is a 1natter that has been before
28
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many courts, both State and Federal. The factual situation, of course, is different, but the rule of law governing
the facts is pretty clear and defined. Keeping in mind
that we are discussing merely the proposition as to
whether or not the insured complied with the terms of
the policy, what are the facts. Unlike some of the cases
where the insured left the state and his presence could
not be found, Pearce admits that on the 1st day of October, 1953, he received official notice by registered mail of
the letter which informed him of the date and place of
trial and which requested his presence, so this court is
not confronted with a situation where the insured received no notice of the hearing. He admits that he did
not attend the trial, so to that extent it must be admitted
that unless he was prevented from attending the trial
by circumstances beyond his control he breached the contract. There is no contention that he was prevented from
attending the trial by reason of sickness, inclement
weather, inability to travel or anything of that nature.
He merely says that the reason that he did not come was
due to his employment ; that his own chances for advancement might have been jeopardized had he requested of
his employer a few days to appear as a witness. In other
words it was a case of measuring his own convenience
with the demands of the policy. He does not contend that
he even asked his employer for permission to attend the
trial. He admits that he never at any time communicated
directly with either the insurance company or its attorney. He never at any time suggested that if a continuance was asked for, that he might come at some later
date. In fact he decided without consultation or advice
29
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that because he had given a written statement to the insurance company that his presence at the trial was unnecessary. It seems to us that the mere statement of the
situation discloses an utter disregard of the duties and
obligations of the insured which constituted a willful
refusal to cooperate in any degree whatsoever in the defense of the action.
Was his presence necessary~ In the written statements. furnished the company both by Pearce and Keith
Oberhansly they had stated that this accident was
caused by reason of the oncoming truck rounding the
curve on the outside or left hand side of the highway
the~e.by .forcing Pearce to pull to his right to avoid a
collision. If this fact was true, then the intervening negligence of the driver of that truck was the proximate cause
of the accident and Pearce's testimony was absolutely
necessary to prove this fact, and that was especially
true when Keith Oberhansly took the stand as a witness
for his brother and changed his testimony from that
given in his written statement.
Counsel will suggest no doubt that defendant should
have taken Pearce's deposition. However, under the
terms of the policy the insured was required to attend
in person and not by deposition. The facts in this case
disclose how ineffective a deposition in advance of trial
would have been. Defendant at that time would not have
known or anticipated that Keith Oberhansly would
change his statement and the subjert matter would not
30
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and could not have been covered or met in his deposition.
This matter of taking depositions is discussed in the case
of
Horton v. Employer's Liability Assurance
Corporation, 164 S.W. 2nd 1011,
wherein the court says:
"The company was entitled to the presence of
the defendant at the trial to meet any surprise
testimony in contravention of the statements
given by the witness, and for this purpose the
company contracted for the defendant's presence
at the trial."
We shall not atternpt to review the many cases dealing with this question. The factual situation is in many
respects · different from the facts in this case, but the
cases are important in that the law is pretty definitely
established.
Fischer v. Western and Southern Indemnity
Company, 106 S.W. 2d 490;
Shalita v. American Motorists Insurance
Company, 41 NYS 2nd 507;
Cameron v. Berger, 1 Atl. 2nd 529;
Indemnity Company of North America v.
Smith, 78 Atl. 2nd 461;
Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 160 N.E. 367;
Glens Falls Indemnity Company v. Keliher,
187 Atl. 473;
McDaniels v. General Insurance Company of
America, 36 Pac. 2nd 829 ;
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, Eakle v. Hayes, 55 Pac. 2d 1072;
Hynding v. ·Home Accident Insurance Com..
pany, 7 Pac. 2nd 999;
Ass~ciated

Indemnity Corporation v. Davis,
45 F. Sup. 118;

Schoenfeld v. New Jersey Fidelity and Plate,
Glass Insurance Company, 197 NYS 606.
The Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company
case is p3:rticularly interesting and persuasive because
the opinion. was· written by Mr. Justice Cordozo and his
observation is ·quoted in subsequent cases. Note the following in speaking of lack of cooperation :
.

'

"In diver's ways there might be defense to a
charge of negligence, or at all events, palliation,
though mistakes were conceded.. The default of
the insured was more than sluggishness or indifference, phases of thought or conduct th~t
might be the subject of various inferences when
, _ considered by a jury. It was so avowed an-d purposed that htt,t pne inference is possible. If this
was cooperation, one is at a loss to imagine when
cooperation ·would be lacking."
Justice Cordozo again uses the following language:
·"The argument misconceives the effect of
a refusal. Cooperation with the insurer is one
of the conditions of the policy. When the condition was broken the policy was at an end if the
insurer so elected. The case is not one of the
breach of a mere covenant where the consequence
nuiy vary with fluctuation of the da1nage. There
has been a failure to fulfill a condition upon which
obligation is dependent."
Annotations are found in
32
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72 A.L.R. 1448 at Page 1469;
98 A.L.R. 1465 at Page 1475.
Defendant pleaded as a further affirmative defense
that Pearce, his business associate or partner, Keith
Oberhansly, and the plaintiff, Oberhansly's brother, conspired to assist plaintiff in procuring this judgment. It
may be as the trial court observed that the evidence
was insufficient to prove a conspiracy. The evidence,
however, did establish a reason for Pearce's refusal to
cooperate and to attend the trial. He and his company
were insolvent. There were already many creditors.
One more judgment creditor would be of little or no consequence. Keith Obers.hansly, his associate, apparently
had nothing, but in any event this insurance policy was
ample protection. Pearce and Keith Oberhansly were
business associates. The brother, Verne Oberhansly,
was a close friend of Pearce. Pearce and Keith Oberhansly gave written statements shortly after the accident, which, in a measure at least, exonerated Pearce, but
a simple expediency of Keith Oberhansly changing his
testimony and Pearce not appearing in his own defense
enabled the plaintiff to obtain a judgment. In the language of Mr. Justice Cordozo, "If this conduct was cooperation, one is at a loss to imagine when cooperation
would be lacking."
We contend therefore that the finding of the court
that, "Pearce did not fail to cooperate with the defendant
insurance company nor did he fail to comply with the
terms of said insurance contract," finds no support
whatsoever in the evidence, and that the evidence con-

33

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

elusively establishes as a matter of law that Pearce
breached the contract by refusing to attend the trial and
by failing to cooperate in the defense of the action and
that as a matter of law the defendant is entitled to preva1.."l..
As heretofore suggested, counsel \vill no doubt argue
that the defendant did not exercise due diligence, but
as we have already indicated, such an issue is wholly
outside any issues in this case and wholly outside any
findings as made by the court. However, if this court
should disagree with this, then it becomes necessary
to comment briefly upon this question. Counsel suggests:
1.
ance.

That defendant should have asked for a continu-

In order to have obtained a continuance it certainly
would have been necessary for counsel to have made a
bona fide showing that it was impossible to obtain the
presence of the defendant at the trial. 'Ve do not believe
that counsel for defendant could have in good faith made
such a showing. }fere inconvenience is hardly sufficient
to justify the granting of a continuance. The fact that
there is cornpetition in the auton1obile business hardly
justifies a continuance. But, furthern1ore, Pearce at no
tirne ever suggested that defendant ask for or obtain a
continuance. He never at any tilue suggested that if
a (•.ontinuance was obtained, he \vould appear at a subsequent date. Here again counsel for defendant could
hardly in good faith ask for a continuance without being
prepared to show that if a continuanre "Tere granted,

••')4
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that the defendant would appear at a later date. Pearce
in his deposition makes it rather clear that he had no
intention of appearing at any time. Competition would
always be present, he says, and furthermore he had given
a written statement. What more was required, he says.
The writer has a pretty distinct feeling that had he
come in and asked for a continuance of this case-, that
counsel for plaintiff who now suggests that a continuance
should have been requested, would have been vociferous
in his objections to the granting of a continuance. Furthermore, the writer of this brief never was told directly that Pearce would not attend and I can state frankly that I thought that he would put in an appearance
at the time of trial.
Did counsel exercise due diligence in trying to persuade Pearce to attend the trial~ He was given notice
by registered mail approximately six weeks before trial
of the date and place of trial and a request for his attendance. When a roundabout rumor reached the "'Titer that
he would not or could not attend, the writer requested his
own father to call him back and explain to him the necessity of appearing and the consequences of his failure to
do so, but, furthermore, the writer then took the matter
up with his own attorney who also interceded by lette·r
to Pearce. It is true that the writer might have sent a
representative of the company to visit him. Certainly
the policy makes no such demands, but if the insured refused to attend after being requested so to do by the
insurance company's attorney, by his own father and by
hi3 own attorney, we fail to see how some representative
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of the company entirely unacquainted with Pearce could
have accomplished what evidently his own father and
his own attorney could not do.
This is a. case where the insured left the State of
Utah, and attempted to conceal his whereabouts, but
his whereabouts was ascertained through the diligence
of the defendant and he was promptly notified, but notwithstanding this fact he refused to attend. We say,
therefore, that if the issue as to the diligence and good
faith of the defendant is an issue in this case, that the
evidence discloses without question that the defendant
did everything required by it under the terms of its
policy and under the law to obtain the presence of the
insured at the trial.
POINTS 3, 4 and 5. The points raised by Points 3,
4 and 5 have all-been fully discussed under Points 1 and
2 and nothing further need be added. If appellant's position on Points 1 and 2 is correct, then it must follow as
a necessary consequence that the findings and judgment
as entered by the trial court cannot be sustained and that
judgment should be entered in favor of defendant dismissing the action.
YOUNG, THATCHER
& GLASMANN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
1018 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
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